

DETAILED REPORT

June 2021 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report





We're constantly working to find and stop coordinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate across our apps.

PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

Over the past three and a half years, we've shared our findings about [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our regular CIB reports, we're sharing information about all networks we take down over the course of a month to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.

WHAT IS CIB?

We view CIB as coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal where fake accounts are central to the operation. There are two tiers of these activities that we work to stop: 1) coordinated inauthentic behavior in the context of domestic, non-government campaigns and 2) coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government actor.

COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOR (CIB)

When we find domestic, non-government campaigns that include groups of accounts and Pages seeking to mislead people about who they are and what they are doing while relying on fake accounts, we remove both inauthentic and authentic accounts, Pages and Groups directly involved in this activity.

FOREIGN OR GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE (FGI)

If we find any instances of CIB conducted on behalf of a government entity or by a foreign actor, we apply the broadest enforcement measures including the removal of every on-platform property connected to the operation itself and the people and organizations behind it.

CONTINUOUS ENFORCEMENT

We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts and Pages connected to networks we took down in the past.

SUMMARY OF JUNE 2021 FINDINGS

Our teams continue to focus on finding and removing deceptive campaigns around the world — whether they are foreign or domestic. In June, we removed eight networks from seven countries, one of which from Ethiopia we [announced](#) earlier in June. The vast majority of these campaigns targeted people in their own countries. We have shared information about our findings with industry partners, researchers, law enforcement and policymakers.

We know that influence operations will keep evolving in response to our enforcement, and new deceptive behaviors will emerge. We will continue to refine our enforcement and share our findings publicly. We are making progress rooting out this abuse, but as we've said before — it's an ongoing effort and we're committed to continually improving to stay ahead. That means building better technology, hiring more people and working closely with law enforcement, security experts and other companies.

Here are the numbers related to the eight CIB networks we removed in June:

- **Total number of Facebook accounts removed: 2,784**
- **Total number of Instagram accounts removed: 206**
- **Total number of Pages removed: 2,249**
- **Total number of Groups removed: 142**

NETWORKS REMOVED IN JUNE 2021:

1. **Iraq, Iran:** We removed 675 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts in Iraq and Iran that targeted audiences in Iraq and were linked to Al-Maaref Radio in Iraq and Alborz Analysis and Development, an IT firm in Tehran. We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
2. **Jordan:** We removed 89 Facebook accounts, 35 Pages, three Groups and 16 Instagram accounts in Jordan that targeted primarily domestic audiences and were linked to individuals in Jordan including those associated with the Jordanian military. We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
3. **Algeria:** We removed 130 Facebook accounts, 221 Pages, 35 Groups, and 29 Instagram accounts in Algeria that targeted primarily domestic audiences and were linked to individuals in Algeria, including some who worked for the 2019 campaign of the current President. We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.

4. **Sudan:** We removed 53 Facebook accounts, 51 Pages, three Groups, and 18 Instagram accounts in Sudan that targeted domestic audiences and were linked to individuals in Sudan including those associated with the Future Movement for Reform and Development, a political party in Sudan. We found this network after reviewing information about some of its activity shared by researchers at Valent Projects.
5. **Mexico:** We removed 1,621 Facebook accounts, 1,795 Pages, 75 Groups, and 93 Instagram accounts in Mexico that focused on the state of Campeche and were linked to individuals in that state, including those working for Worgcorp, a political strategy and public relations firm in Mexico. We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the Mexican elections.
6. **Mexico:** We removed 122 Facebook accounts, 69 Pages, and four accounts on Instagram in Mexico that targeted domestic audiences in Nayarit and Sinaloa states and were linked to two PR firms in Mexico — Global Consultoria and Pro Publicity. We found this network after reviewing public reporting in Mexico about suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the election in June.
7. **Mexico:** We removed 32 Facebook accounts, 23 Pages, and four Instagram accounts in Mexico that focused on domestic audiences in the San Luis Potosi state and were linked to individuals associated with Ricardo Gallardo Cardona’s political campaign. We found this activity after reviewing information shared by researchers at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Research Lab about suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the June election.
8. **Ethiopia:** We removed 62 Facebook accounts, 49 Pages, 26 Groups, and 32 accounts on Instagram in Ethiopia that targeted domestic audiences and were linked to individuals associated with INSA, the Information Network Security Agency in Ethiopia. We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. (Originally [announced](#) on June 16, 2021).

01

We removed 675 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [foreign interference](#), which is [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#) on behalf of a foreign entity. This network originated in Iraq and Iran and targeted audiences in Iraq.

The people behind this activity used fake accounts — many of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems. This network primarily focused on commenting on their own and other people’s Pages — including Al-Maaref Radio in Iraq and other connected brands — to make particular viewpoints appear more popular than they were. The vast majority of these fake accounts were created in October 2020 and were most prolific in their commenting activity in April 2021. Some of these accounts used stock photos as profile pictures, and many posted almost nothing on their own newsfeed.

This network posted in Arabic about news and current events in Iraq, including supportive commentary about Iran and its military, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a coalition of Shia militias in Iraq, the Syrian regime, and Hezbollah. They also criticized Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United States, and Turkey for their foreign policy in the region.

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to Al-Maaref Radio in Iraq and Alborz Analysis and Development, an IT firm in Tehran.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 675 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 361,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and about 216,000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Less than \$12,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for in US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.



Translation

Page name: Fingerprint of a Young Iraqi

Caption: Just as Iraq was besieged by America in Saddam's time, today it's Syria, and tomorrow we don't [yet] know. But Islamic Iran broke the brutal siege before, and [still does] today!



Translation

Page name: Fingerprint of a Young Iraqi

Caption: Political developments in the Middle East: Iranian television broadcasts accurate footage showing an IRGC drone flying above an American aircraft carrier in the Gulf



Translation

Page name: Bahloul

Caption: When are you going to get your occupying soldiers out of our country?

Image overlay:

"Oh my god, is this man infected with Coronavirus or has he become a zombie?!"

"Neither... he got the Pfizer vaccine..."

02

We removed 89 Facebook accounts, 35 Pages, three Groups, and 16 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in Jordan and targeted primarily domestic audiences.

The people behind this network used fake accounts — some of which were already detected and disabled by our automated systems — to post and amplify their own content to make it appear more popular than it was, manage Pages and post critical comments on other people’s content, including Jordanian dissidents. Some of the accounts went through significant name changes and also used stock photos of young women as profile pictures. This network posted primarily in Arabic about news and current events including patriotism; Islamism; coronavirus; events in Palestine; supportive commentary about the King of Jordan and the Jordanian military; and criticism of Jordanian activists and dissidents and the Israeli military.

We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals in Jordan including those associated with the Jordanian military.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 89 Facebook accounts, 35 Pages, three Groups and 16 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 634,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, less than 300 people joined one or more of these Groups, and around 500 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* About \$26,500 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.

وكالة هنا الأردن الاخبارية
Apr 7, 2021 4:15am · 🌐

جنود يحمي المملكة بالخارج وإنتا مسؤوليتك تحميها بالداخل ... #كلناجيشكياوطن #كلناجنودكياوطن
#كلنا_الجيش_العربي #مع_الجيش #الاردنخطاحمر #الجيشخطاحمر #لا_للاساءة

Translate



Translation

Page name: Here is Jordan News Agency


Caption: Soldiers protect the kingdom externally, and your responsibility is to protect it from within

الجزيرة - الأردن
May 4, 2021 3:05pm · 🌐

الملك يطلع على دبابه "سينتارو" التي دخلت الخدمة حديثا

Translate

Album containing 4 item(s)



الله يعطيهم العافية قراننا المسلحة الباسلة فعلا معدات واليات جديدة دائما مواكبين لتطوير المعدات والتحديث

Translate

👍 4 🙏 4

Translation

Page name: Here is Jordan News Agency

Caption: Soldiers protect the kingdom externally, and your responsibility is to protect it from within



يوميات أردني

Jan 24, 2021 2:42pm · 🌐

وزير العمل الدكتور معن القطامين | عدد العاطلين عن العمل
يقدر بـ ٤٠٠ الف مواطن احنا حطينك وزير تعدهم ولا
تشغلهم؟

Translate



Translation

Page name: Here is Jordan News Agency

Caption: Soldiers protect the kingdom externally,
and your responsibility is to protect it from within

03

We removed 130 Facebook accounts, 221 Pages, 35 Groups, and 29 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in and targeted primarily Algeria.

The people behind this activity used duplicate and fake accounts — some of which were already detected and disabled by our automated systems — to amplify their own content, comment on other people’s posts, run Pages masquerading as news entities and pose as Moroccan and Algerian nationals, as well as members of Algeria’s Amazigh minority group. Some of the accounts used stock photos of young women as profile pictures. Some of the Pages purported to represent the Algerian opposition. This operation appeared to be active across multiple social media platforms and forums. They posted personal photos and information of family members of opposition leaders and a journalist, allegedly obtained through hacking. They also posted screen recordings claiming to show the compromising of dissidents’ devices and online accounts.

They posted in Arabic about news and current events in the region, including rumors of the death of the Moroccan king; supportive commentary about the Algerian military; and critical comments about ethnic minorities, opposition, journalists, and dissidents in Algeria and those living abroad. This operation appeared to play on both sides of the political spectrum by running Pages posing as the members of the Amazigh minority or the opposition, while other Pages criticized these same groups.

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals in Algeria including some who worked for the 2019 campaign of the current President.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 130 Facebook accounts, 221 Pages, 35 Groups, and 29 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 3.97 million accounts followed one or more of these Pages, around 5,000 people joined one or more of these Groups, and about 11,000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.

- **Advertising:** Around \$5,500 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in euros and US dollars.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.



Translation

Page name: Honor and Pride of the Algerian Nation

Caption: Ministry of Communication withdraws accreditation for the channel France 24 in Algeria

Image overlay: Terrorism Channel



Translation

Caption: You destroyed the country, you thieves, these people destroyed the country, and they are thieves and traitors, we wait for all of them, they should be hung to death.



Translation

Caption: Watch the reaction of the Algerian soldier to the "Crush 2021" maneuver. And watch the reaction of the Moroccan soldiers to the "Rabbit" maneuver

04

We removed 53 Facebook accounts, 51 Pages, three Groups, and 18 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in and targeted Sudan.

The individuals behind this activity used duplicate and fake accounts — some of which were already detected and disabled by our automated systems — to manage Pages, drive people to their website, evade enforcement, post, and amplify their content to make it appear more popular than it was. Some of these Pages posed as media entities in Sudan. One of this network's Pages was previously removed for impersonating a government agency. This operation posted primarily in Arabic about news and current events in Sudan including Islamic political parties; the Muslim Brotherhood; the 1989 Sudanese coup; the need for normalization of Sudanese-Israeli relations; and criticism of the Communist Party, secularism, feminism, and the current transitional government in Sudan.

We found this network after reviewing information about some of its activity shared by researchers at Valent Projects. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals in Sudan including those associated with the Future Movement for Reform and Development, a political party in Sudan.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 53 Facebook accounts, 51 Pages, three Groups, and 18 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 1.8 million accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 43,000 accounts joined one or more of these Groups, and around 8,700 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* About \$700 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in Turkish lira and Saudi Arabian riyal.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.



Translation

Page name: General Bashir

Caption: More than two years after President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir's departure, in which the country was besieged by economic sanctions, and the financing and arming of hundreds of armed movements to stop development and exhaust the country by costs of war, how do you evaluate its rule without bias?



Translation

Page name: The Islamic current

Caption: After the deterioration of living conditions, the collapse of the Sudanese economy, the indifference of a government that abandoned Sudanese citizens, the fluctuation of the dollar price, the high prices, the lack of bread, fuel and cooking gas, the lack of transportation, poor wages and the great insecurity in the country, what is your position on the government of Hamdok?

- Change Hamdok's Government Staff
- Dismissal of Hamdok and his government



Translation

Page name: Islamic Direction

Image overlay: #Just_Go

05

We removed 1,621 Facebook accounts, 1,795 Pages, 75 Groups, and 93 Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in Mexico and focused on the state of Campeche in Mexico.

The individuals behind this activity operated fake accounts, many of which were already detected and disabled by our automated systems. They also created Pages designed to look like user profiles — using false names and stock images — to comment in Spanish and amplify content about various candidates in the June 2021 election in Campeche. They primarily focused on the gubernatorial election in the state of Campeche, including promoting two opposing candidates for governor. At least one Page posed as a local Telemundo Page. Many of the accounts went through significant name changes over time.

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the Mexican elections. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals in Campeche, including those working for Worgcorp, a political strategy and public relations firm in Mexico.


- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 1,621 Facebook accounts, 1,795 Pages, 75 Groups, and 93 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 353,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, less than 140,000 accounts joined one or more of these Groups, and around 49,000 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* About \$315,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in Mexican peso. That includes the entirety of historic advertising activity by both inauthentic and authentic accounts removed as part of this network engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.

June 3 2021 12:16am UTC+00:00 · 913687902745659

Portavoz Campeche
June 2 2021 11:32pm

¡Vamos a reforzar el rumbo que llevamos!
[Translate](#)



Translation

Page name: Campeche Spokesperson

Caption: Let's reinforce the course we lead!

August 15 2018 8:34pm

Que exista más proyectos asi, pero aqui en Merida!!!!
[Translate](#)

Alito Lovers
August 15 2018 2:52pm

¡Qué rápido pasa el tiempo! Hace 10 meses que comenzaron a funcionar los autobuses de transporte escolar gratuito "Aprender en Grande". 🚌La administración de Alito apoya a los niños y jóvenes para que tengan acceso a la educación. #AlitoLovers
[Translate](#)



Translation

Caption: That should be more projects like this, but here in Merida

Original post's caption: How fast time flies! Free "Learn in Grande" school buses started running 10 months ago. Alito administration supports children and young people to access education. #AlitoLovers

June 2 2021 10:30pm

Portavoz Campeche
June 2 2021 9:54pm

#Defender tu seguridad y la de tu familia. : Christian Castro Bello.
Translate



Translation

Page name: Campeche Spokesperson

Caption: #Defend your safety and your family. : Christian Castro Bello.

Image overlay: #Defend your safety and your family

Christian Castro Governor

06

We removed 122 Facebook accounts, 69 Pages, and four accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in Mexico and targeted domestic audiences in Nayarit and Sinaloa states in Mexico.

The people behind this activity used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to post in Groups and amplify content in support of particular political candidates in the June 2021 elections in Nayarit and Sinaloa states. They focused on promoting particular candidates from the PAN party and the “Va por Mexico” party alliance, while criticizing other candidates from these same parties. Some of these accounts appeared to be compromised; others used stock images of young women as profile photos. Some of the Pages posed as media entities, a handful of Pages had been previously removed for impersonating news organizations.

We found this network after reviewing public reporting in Mexico about suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the election in June. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to two PR firms in Mexico — Global Consultoria and Pro Publicity.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 122 Facebook accounts, 69 Pages, and 4 accounts on Instagram.
- *Followers:* About 153,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and around 1,000 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* About \$128,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in Mexican peso.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.

3N Información 3N
June 4 2021 3:36am · 🌐

ALEJANDRO GALVAN UN PERSONAJE OSCURO Y MALVADO . El personaje malvado hoy vestido con piel de MORENA Alejandro Galván es el dueño de páginas de Facebook en las que se ataca a los contrincantes de su muuuy querida Geraldine Ponce.

[Translate](#)



Translation

Page name: 3N Information

Caption: ALEJANDRO GALVAN A DARK AND EVIL CHARACTER. The evil character that today dresses in the skin of MORENA Alejandro Galvan is the owner of Facebook pages to attack candidates in opposition to his dear Geraldine Ponce.

Image overlay: Alejandro Galvan, narcissist, liar, thief

Chicas y mujres de santiago ixcuintla nayariten busca de apollo\$\$\$
March 20 2021 6:08pm

Adelante Lic Hugo Rodríguez, el pueblo está contigo, los colonos te respandan.👍

[Translate](#)

Periódico Realidades de Nayarit
March 19 2021 8:33pm · 🌐

Hugo Rodríguez con el Respaldo Ciudadano. Siguen los procesos internos para candidaturas a diferentes puestos de elección en el partido de Morena en la que una vez mas el joven Tepicense Hugo Rodríguez se encuentra muy bien posicionado y que ha encontrado el respaldo de su gente en las diferentes colonias de Tepic.

[Translate](#)



Translation

Caption: Forward Mr. Hugo Rodriguez, the people are with you, the neighbors back you.

Original post's caption: Hugo Rodriguez has the citizens' support. The internal processes for candidates to different roles in the election for Morena are still ongoing, and once again the young man from Tepic Hugo Rodriguez is well positioned and has found support from people in the different neighborhoods of Tepic.



Translation

Caption: We will win! For Ivideliza Reyes Hernandez, because we all want a better Tepic.

Original post's caption: As mayor of Tepic, I will give it to you straight, without fear and without hiding, because I've got #Braverytogoaround. In politics, what distinguishes me are results. Which is why on June 6, #Voteorange and together, let's make this the best government in Tepic history. You should also be brave to vote for good government and the Citizen's Movement political party.

07

We removed 32 Facebook accounts, 23 Pages, and four Instagram accounts for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in Mexico and focused on domestic audiences in the San Luis Potosi state in Mexico.

The people behind this activity used fake accounts to post in Groups, react to and share comments in Spanish on posts about the gubernatorial election in San Luis Potosi, including content by the official Pages of some candidates and parties. They also ran Pages posing as local news entities. This network focused primarily on posting about the candidates from the Green and Labor party coalition and the campaign of Ricardo Gallardo Cardona, while criticizing candidates Octavio Pedroza and Xavier Nava.

We found this activity after reviewing information shared by researchers at the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensics Research Lab about suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the June election. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with Cardona's political campaign.

- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 32 Facebook accounts, 23 Pages, and four Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* Around 412,000 accounts followed one or more of these Pages, and around 4,200 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* Around \$26,000 in spending for ads on Facebook and Instagram paid for primarily in Mexican peso.

Below is a sample of the content posted by some of these accounts and Pages.



Translation

Page name: My San Luis

Caption: We are weeks away from defining the result of the election in San Luis Potosí, after the campaigns, debates, tours and having listened to the proposals of each one. Who will you vote for this June 6?

Image overlay: Who will you give your vote to for governor?



Translation

Page name: Hello San Luis

Caption: What is seen, doesn't need to be asked...
Citizenship support is more than clear
#HolaSanLuis

Image overlay: Gallardo with his masters / Octavio with his masters



Translation

Page name: The Spectator of Mexico

Caption: Xavier Nava returning to the UAM after leaving his post for 6 months due to his failed campaign. 🤔🤔🤔🤔

Image overlay: I'M BACK!

08

We removed 62 Facebook accounts, 49 Pages, 26 Groups, and 32 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#). This network originated in and focused on domestic audiences in Ethiopia.

The operation used duplicate and fake accounts — some of which were already detected and disabled by our automated systems — to post and comment on their own content, and manage Groups and Pages, including those posing as media entities. The campaign appeared to accelerate its posting activity in 2020 and into 2021, and some of its recent content was rated false by independent fact-checkers and labeled as misleading. Some of the accounts went through significant name changes over time. They also used spam-like inauthentic distribution tactics to post the same content across multiple Pages and Groups simultaneously, including other people’s Groups.

This network posted primarily in Amharic about news and current events in Ethiopia, including the Prosperity party, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and criticism of Egypt and Sudan related to Ethiopia’s mega dam project. They also posted critical commentary about various opposition politicians and groups in Ethiopia, including the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ethiopian Democratic Party, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, among others. Most recently, they commented about protests against the US sanctions on Ethiopia. We assess that this activity was not directly focused on the Tigray region or the ongoing conflict in Tigray.

We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with INSA, the Information Network Security Agency in Ethiopia.


- *Presence on Facebook and Instagram:* 62 Facebook accounts, 49 Pages, 26 Groups and 32 Instagram accounts.
- *Followers:* About 1.1 million accounts followed one or more of these Pages, about 766,000 accounts joined one or more of these Groups, and around 1,700 people followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
- *Advertising:* About \$7,200 in spending for ads paid for in US dollars.



Translation

Caption: The supporters of the junta which has been blown to ashes in two weeks by our military and amhara special forces are now using hashtag campaigns to get international intervention and support. this is a nightmare. Does one think the group which has been defeated while having tanks and missiles can come back to life through a false campaign? Never. This is like trying to hug a cloud.

Image overlay: The Tigray genocide is only happening on social media, particularly on Twitter



Translation

Image overlay: Those who know him, know him well. Those who don't know him are getting to know him now. he knows how to persuade his enemies with his bright path.

Stay strong our leader. Millions of us have decided to stand with you



Addis Media Network-AMN

AMN was live.

Jun 3, 2021 9:12am · 🌐

Press release from the office of the prime minister

[Undo](#)



👍 551 ❤️ 40 😂 10 🤔 4 😞 1 🙄 4



Maraki Insight

America should stop one side's support. TPLF(terrorist) fighters attacking innocent people and try to block humanitarian assistance. America tries to investigate what is actually happening we Ethiopians love each other! If you want to be part of our prosperity help fairly.



Maraki Insight

Sudan and Egypt, you have no chance of stopping the GERD. The only option available is a negotiation that makes every concerned body a winner.

[Translate](#)

👍 1



Maraki Insight

TPLF doesn't know the history of Ethiopianism and patriotism / TPLF / is a organization that has no patriotism but not a patriot.



Maraki Insight

Here is the thing, Ethiopia is a sovereign nation and the USA has no business in Ethiopian internal affairs!

[Translate](#)

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